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Abstract 
This paper investigates how European countries have responded to 
the issue of irregular migrant labor in recent decades. The European 
Union has declared that jobs in shadow economies are a major pull 
for undocumented migrants, and since the 1990s, a number of indi-
vidual states and the EU have ramped up efforts to combat irregular 
migrant work. This paper charts and characterizes trends in these 
policy initiatives over time, and across countries, in an effort to un-
derstand both how states concretely go about trying to control irreg-
ular migration, and to shed light on the political economy of labor 
migration. I argue that European integration and asylum crises help 
explain the common trend toward hardening labor market controls, 
as well as the growing EU emphasis on the issue. Cross-national 
differences remain, however, in the level of effort expended on root-
ing out and repressing irregular migrant work; these differences 
reflect varying political dynamics over shadow economies and the 
institutionalized power of economic interest groups.  
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Border control connotes, in the minds of many, the “police dogs, elec-
tric wires, and helicopters…incarceration, deportation, torture, shoot-
ing on sight, and so on” (Abizadeh 2008, 46) that are deployed to keep 
non-nationals out and, in some dictatorial regimes, keep nationals in. 
Along with passport checks and visa requirements, these are some of 
the more visible means by which state officials attempt to preserve 
their monopoly over the movement of people (Torpey 1998). Yet, in 
Europe today, most undocumented migrants enter legally and simply 
stay (Triandafyllidou 2010). Moreover, the free movement of people 
within the Schengen zone has undercut the ability of many European 
states to physically bar unwelcome visitors from the territory. In re-
sponse, many of these states have constructed a different set of barri-
ers – walls around welfare states and labor markets in order to prevent 
unauthorized entry (Engbersen 2003). These efforts have been sus-
tained and reinforced by European-level initiatives to combat undoc-
umented migrant labor and shadow economies. The underlying aim 
has been to make life difficult for unauthorized migrants – creating a 
“hostile environment,” in the words of British Home Secretary There-
sa May – so that they will leave or be deterred from coming in the first 
place. 
This paper explores the walls that have been constructed and fortified 
around labor markets in Western Europe since the mid-1970s – the 
time by which a number of states had closed their doors to large-scale 
guestworker and post-colonial migration, and immigration policy 
started becoming more restrictive. At first glance, it may seem self-
evident that, once governments decide to limit labor migration, they 
adopt control mechanisms against future unauthorized workers. In 
fact, there are considerable differences in these efforts, both across 
countries and over time. Investigating these measures sheds light on 
how states actually go about enforcing immigration control. 
This paper has both descriptive and explanatory findings. The descrip-
tive findings concern overall patterns of state initiatives to combat 
undocumented migrant work over the past few decades and the timing 
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of these changes. Across Western Europe, there has been an increased 
focus on rooting out and repressing unauthorized migrant work that 
began in some countries by the 1990s, but that spread and intensified 
in the first decade of the 2000s. This agenda dovetailed with, and was 
fueled by, a wider mobilization of resources to combat undeclared 
work and the shadow economy. There is variation, however, in the 
degree of effort. In general, there is a North-South divide, as Nordic 
and continental European countries, as well as the UK in recent years, 
have been more vigorous in pursuing these initiatives than have gov-
ernments in Southern Europe. 
What is driving these developments and the differences in them? The 
explanation for the temporal trend lies in the very forces that can be 
said to undermine states – globalization and Europeanization. As these 
forces have eroded the power of states to directly control migration 
flows, the response of state officials has been to construct internal 
controls. In other words, as exterior walls have been lowered, or 
breached, states have built or reinforced internal ones. In particular, 
the push toward a border-free Europe, and its extension to new mem-
ber states in the South and East, spurred a scramble by other EU states 
to construct higher internal barriers to migration. States in the North 
and West then worked through the European Union to pressure states 
in the South and East to impose stricter controls on undocumented 
work. The result has been a European-wide campaign against illegal 
work and shadow economies that is aimed particularly at the newer 
member-states and those on the Mediterranean rim. 
Within this overall trajectory of growing controls on undocumented 
migrant labor, there remain cross-national differences in the extent of 
these efforts that reflect variations in the domestic political economy 
of irregular migration and power of economic interest groups in politi-
cal systems. In Southern Europe, the large informal economy predates 
the inflow of migrant labor but has been reinforced by it. This gener-
ates political obstacles to repressive state policies toward undocu-
mented work, including by businesses that rely heavily on it. In addi-
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tion, labor unions in this region generally lack institutionalized power 
and have, in many cases, experienced organizational decline. Their 
interests thus have lain more in championing migrant workers (as fu-
ture union members) than in what they see as futile efforts by state 
agents to enforce labor law. 
In the Northern European economies, by contrast, irregular migrant 
labor is often in small, marginal firms that lack power in the economic 
sphere; employers‟ associations more often represent firms operating 
on the basis of high-skilled labor and whose interests lie more in re-
pressing “disloyal competition” or “social dumping” from firms using 
immigrant work, either domestically or elsewhere in Europe. Their 
views generally align with those of large labor confederations that 
have some amount of institutionalized power over labor market poli-
cy. Unions in this context have been less inclined to reach out to mi-
grant workers and more apt to push for, and even participate in, the 
enforcement of bans on the hiring of unauthorized migrant workers, 
although the behavior of unions in France and the UK has been more 
like those in Southern Europe, reflecting their lesser power. 
These findings have larger implications for how we think about states 
in Europe and their relationship to economic forces. Against those 
who emphasize the erosion of state power in the face of neo-
liberalism, globalization, or European integration, this examination of 
the concrete practices of internal border control reveals instead the 
reconfiguration and resilience of state power. Particularly in Northern 
Europe, state officials have worked to build up their infrastructural 
capacities when it comes to irregular migration – their ability to reach 
deep into society and compel agents in civil society to do their work. 
Rather than the state being hollowed out, its power has been restruc-
tured, and in some ways enhanced, by the process of European inte-
gration. 
Theorizing States and Borders 
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Studies of immigration policy and its determinants have been shaped 
by debates about the power of modern states and the workings of 
democratic politics. Some early efforts at theorizing immigration poli-
cy investigated whether states had lost the ability to control “unwanted 
migration” (Joppke 1998), and thus emphasized the constraining ef-
fects of globalization, European integration, and human rights-
protecting institutions, domestic or international (Hollifield 1992; Sas-
sen 1998; Joppke and Marzal 2004). Another line of argument pointed 
to the imbalance of interests in democratic societies when it comes to 
immigration – the strength of vested interests, such as business or eth-
nic lobbies, with a stake in more open policies versus the generally 
immigration-hostile, yet unorganized mass public (Castles and Kosack 
1985; Freeman 1995).  Many scholars thus highlighted various gaps – 
the gap between mass opinion and immigration policy outcomes, for 
instance, or the gap between stated policy goals and outcomes – that 
make immigration policy a case study of failure (Castles 2004; Cor-
nelius and Tsuda 2004; Andreas 2009). 
Others have countered that states are alive and well when it comes to 
immigration control (Guiraudon and Joppke 2001; Guiraudon and 
Lahav 2000), particularly when immigration flows and policies are 
viewed in a longer historical perspective (Zolberg 1999; Peters 2015). 
States did relatively little to police their frontiers during the 19
th
 and 
early 20
th
 centuries (Mullan 1998), and during the three decades after 
the second world war, a number of West European countries effective-
ly opened their doors to large-scale migration from former colonies 
and other developing nations (Castles and Kosack 1985). Since the 
mid-1970s, however, many of these countries have significantly re-
duced immigration flows, and irregular migration, while spiking at 
some time periods and in particular parts of the continent, is not par-
ticularly high and lower than U.S. levels (Schain 2013). Particularly 
when viewed from the standpoint of those who experience immigra-
tion controls, the state seems hardly like a “zombie” category at all 
(Engbersen and Broeders 2009, 869). 
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The fact that states still have the ability to manage migration raises the 
question of how they actually control migration given the pressures 
that are supposed to be undermining them – liberal democratic poli-
tics, global economic forces, and the formal demise of borders within 
much of Europe. One way to investigate this question is to examine 
the concrete practices of immigration control, a subject that has gener-
ally received less attention from immigration scholars (notable excep-
tions include Hammar and Brochmann 1999; Guiraudon 2002; Eller-
mann 2006; Engbersen and Broeders 2009). An important step for-
ward in this line of inquiry is the work by Guiraudon and Lahav 
(2000; and Lahav and Guiraudon [2006]) showing that European 
states have shifted immigration control to new sites and actors, includ-
ing the European Union, transport companies, and local governments. 
Other work has focused on the development of new forms of identifi-
cation control and surveillance using biometrics and computerized 
data (Engbersen and Broeders 2009). This research reveals that, while 
land borders in Europe may be under pressure, “re-bordering” is under 
way through the erection of digital barriers to entry and expansion of 
the state‟s reach through an array of governmental and non-
governmental agents (Andreas 2000). 
Labor markets are one important site of re-bordering that has received 
less attention thus far.
1
 Yet, labor markets are at the center of the im-
migration problem as seen by state officials: many migrants move to 
seek out economic opportunities elsewhere, and those who are pushed 
out of their home countries by repression or violence, or are drawn in 
to new countries by family ties, are likely to seek a foothold in paid 
work. One way to combat undocumented immigration is to render 
these migrants‟ lives hopelessly precarious – to undermine their abil-
ity to earn a living so that they will choose, in the words of 2012 US 
presidential candidate Mitt Romney, to “self-deport.” Closing off the 
doors to the labor market also excludes undocumented migrants from 
                                                   
1
 The most comprehensive work on this was done by Marie (1994), Miller (1995) 
and Martin and Miller (2000), and touched upon by Guiraudon and Lahav (2000). 
LIEPP Working Paper n° 54 
7 
much social welfare provision, as formal employment is usually es-
sential in entitling one to a pension, disability insurance, unemploy-
ment compensation, and other social supports (Engbersen 2003). In 
general, policy-makers and many scholars view sanctions on employ-
ers who hire undocumented migrants as an important tool of immigra-
tion enforcement because they tackle the demand for this labor rather 
than solely going after the supply (Ruhs 2006, 16).  
What is behind the move to erect walls around labor markets and de-
terminedly police them, and why have some states done more in this 
regard than others? There may be international pressures on states, 
most likely stemming from European integration and the free move-
ment of people, that have induced states to do more to police domestic 
labor markets. For example, the European Union has taken a greater 
role in immigration-related issues, and it could be pushing states to 
adopt tougher policies against illegal migrant work. Domestically, 
these measures could reflect the relative power of capital and labor, 
and/or the extent of left- and right-wing party dominance. Here, there 
may be cross-national differences in the interests of employers and 
labor unions in the treatment of undocumented migrant work, depend-
ing on how which sectors of the economy rely on this type of labor. 
Moreover, some scholars have hypothesized that the power and insti-
tutionalization of labor unions may influence their stances on migra-
tion, with politically weaker unions being more open to legal and ille-
gal migrants as a potential source of future union members. The stance 
of the social partners may be especially important on this issue, be-
cause enforcement of labor law relies on the compliance, or even ac-
tive participation, of employers and unions. Fierce opposition to em-
ployer sanctions laws is thus unlikely to undermine them. 
To evaluate these arguments, the next section of the paper lays out and 
interprets some of the main cross-national and inter-temporal patterns 
of labor market controls. The succeeding two sections then move to 
evaluating evidence that would support or disconfirm various explana-
tions for these patterns. 
2016/05 
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Patterns of Controls on Undocumented Migrant Labor 
How can states prevent undocumented workers from gaining access to 
their labor markets? Doing so requires not just formal laws against 
hiring such workers, but also bureaucratic mechanisms and capabili-
ties to enforce these laws. Typically, employers face sanctions – in-
cluding administrative fines, criminal actions, and possibly even jail 
time – for hiring undocumented workers, but in some countries work-
ers themselves can be targeted by fines, prison time, and/or deporta-
tion (Robin and Barros 2000). As ineffective employer sanctions in 
the U.S. have shown, however, policy-makers need to go beyond cre-
ating formal penalties and develop enforcement mechanisms with real 
teeth. This means directing labor inspectors, customs officials, border 
control agents, or other personnel to ferreting out and penalizing the 
hiring of undocumented workers. In many cases, these efforts require 
considerable bureaucratic coordination, with a willingness on the part 
of “street-level bureaucrats,” employers, or labor unions to report vio-
lators to the appropriate authorities. Moreover, preexisting institution-
al capacity can matter a good deal: a state with a well-functioning na-
tional identification system, for instance, might be better able to locate 
and target undocumented migrant work than one without national 
identity cards or local registration requirements. 
Finally, in many countries, the undocumented workforce is inextrica-
bly linked to the shadow economy as a whole. It is for that reason that 
the campaign against undocumented labor has, in many countries and 
from the standpoint of the European Union, become part of a larger 
set of initiatives against hidden work (Marie 1994; Commission of the 
European Communities, 2007). Thus, states can adopt broader efforts 
against fraudulent work that may include punitive measures but also 
inducements to bring shadow economic transactions into the light. 
Simplifying administrative procedures and/or subsidizing the social 
contributions and other costs of low-wage work, for instance, might 
induce those working in the underground economy to work above 
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board (Winkelmann, Schmidt and Leichsenring 2015; Morel and Car-
bonnier 2015, 8-9). This, in turn, constricts the space available for 
undocumented workers, as more employers – including those of indi-
vidual household workers – might choose to declare their employee 
rather than hire someone lacking authorization to work. For the pur-
poses of space, this paper focuses more narrowly on employer sanc-
tions and other measures designed to ferret out and punish illegal 
work, but it should be noted that there is a broader campaign afoot in a 
number countries to bring illegal work into the light through mixes of 
punitive measures and incentive schemes (Williams 2008).
2
  
There is considerable geographic variation across Western Europe in 
the extent of labor market control mechanisms (I am not addressing 
Eastern Europe in this paper given limits of space and expertise). In 
general, the level of labor market control diminishes from North to 
South, with the Nordic countries having the most tightly regulated 
labor market access and the Southern European countries having the 
least. In the Nordic countries, this is in part a reflection of preexisting 
state capacity to document and surveil the population. Nordic coun-
tries have comprehensive population registries that date back centuries 
and assign every resident a number that provides access to paid work, 
social benefits, schools, banks, and other types of services (Krogness 
2011). Without a registration number, which is assigned at birth or 
else when one attains legal immigrant status, a person is effectively 
shut out of the main social and economic institutions, including the 
formal labor market (Brochmann 1999, 217; Hammar 1999, 187; 
Sigvardsdotter 2012). 
There is considerably greater space for undocumented immigrants in 
Southern European economies, which tend to have large informal sec-
tors that offer ample possibilities for undocumented work. Some esti-
mate the size of the shadow economy as ranging from one-fifth to 
                                                   
2
 Examples include the creation of the mini-jobs category in Germany or the creation 
of chèques-service in Belgium and France that facilitate the payment of social con-
tributions of domestic care and cleaning workers. 
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almost one-third of GDP in these regions (Figure 1), and irregular 
migrants are important to a number of sectors operating in these eco-
nomic gray zones. In Southern Europe, one of the main policy mecha-
nisms for dealing with undocumented workers has been to regularize 
them – to adopt large-scale amnesties for irregular migrants that then 
enable their work to be brought into the formal sphere of tax obliga-
tions and social rights (Papadopoulou 2005; Triandafyllidou and Am-
brosini 2011).  Outside of periodic amnesties, these countries long 
devoted relatively little attention to controlling either undocumented 
workers or combatting the informal sector more generally. Although 
Italy began increasing the numbers of labor inspectors in 2007 (Pas-
tore 2008, 119), during the economic crisis it reduced workplace con-
trols, seemingly because the undeclared economy was viewed as a 
kind of “safety net” during the downturn (Fasani 2010, 183). More 
generally, implementation has been impeded by an apparent lack of 
political will and the uneven distribution of inspectors and controls 
across the country and (Finotelli and Sciortino 2009, 131; Triandafyl-
lidou and Ambrosini 2011, 270). Similarly, Spain has formally inten-
sified its efforts against undocumented work since 2005, but bureau-
cratic weaknesses have impeded the enforcement of these measures 
(Gómez and De Carlos 2008, 160; Aparacio et al. 2008). Greece also 
has not devoted many resources to implementing controls on labor 
markets (Triandafyllidou and Ambrosini 2011, 262). 
The remaining countries of continental Europe and the UK lie be-
tween these two poles, with some heterogeneity among them. Some 
countries with effective bureaucratic mechanisms for identifying and 
sanctioning illegal work include Austria, Belgium, Germany, the 
Netherlands (since the late 1990s), and Switzerland (Doomernik and 
Jandl 2008, 206; Düvell 2006, 190-1). Germany, for example, con-
ducts identification checks in public spaces, and when social service 
or educational personnel encounter an undocumented immigrant in 
welfare or educational settings they are required to notify immigration 
officials (Glorius 2008, 91, 98-9). There also are considerable barriers 
to employing undocumented workers: before hiring, employers have 
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to see a person‟s wage card, health insurance card, and social security 
number, and cross-checking by computer systems linked to these dif-
ferent cards would likely uncover any effort to present false docu-
ments or numbers, triggering the attention of immigration authorities 
(Vogel 2000, 408; Glorius 2008, 97). Workplace investigations are 
conducted by customs officials who have police powers and the ability 
to check a person‟s residence status on-site (Glorius 2008, 97). This 
commitment to detecting undocumented work is not new: Martin and 
Miller noted back in 2000 that Germany appeared to spend “more to 
prevent the employment of illegal foreign workers than any other 
country” (21), and attention to this issue has hardly slackened since. In 
2005, 6200 customs authorities agents were tasked with rooting out 
undeclared work and tax fraud, and 81,300 criminal procedures were 
launched in that year against violators (Volger-Ludwig 2007, 6). 
Compared to Germany, France is often portrayed as somewhat less 
effective in controlling undocumented immigrant work (Martin and 
Miller 2000; Doomernik and Jandl 2008, 206), although it has steadily 
ramped up sanctions and devoted more resources to their enforcement. 
Control of undocumented migrant work is one component of two larg-
er bureaucratic efforts – campaigns against illegal immigration, on the 
one hand, and a more general effort to uncover and penalize unde-
clared work and the shadow economy (Marie 1994). Both involve an 
array of different personnel operating under the ambit of the Minis-
tries of Interior and Labor. Labor inspectors, customs officials, inspec-
tors of the social security funds, and two branches of national law en-
forcement (police nationale and gendarmerie) are involved in efforts 
to identify, penalize, and thus deter illegal work. Both the gendarme-
rie
3
 and border police have offices
4
 that are charged with managing 
enforcement efforts, and a Commission nationale de lutte contre le 
travail illégal is charged with coordinating all of these actions, as are 
                                                   
3
  Office central de lutte contre le travail illégal (OCLTI). 
4
 Office central pour la répression de l’immigration irrégulière et de l’emploi 
d’étrangers (OCRIEST). 
2016/05 
12 
department-level local committees against fraud.
5
 Finally, employers 
must verify the status of foreigners they wish to hire; between 2007 
and 2013, municipal prefectures received over 3-1/2 million checks 
and found more than 31,000 instances of fake documents, with the 
numbers of these documents unearthed declining significantly since 
2008 (Les étrangers en France 2014, 100). 
The UK offers an even more mixed picture of internal immigration 
control, at least until recently. One the one hand, its informal economy 
is smaller than that found in Southern Europe (Schneider 2015), yet 
like many Southern European countries, the UK has experienced sig-
nificant migration since the late 1990s, and it often has lacked the po-
litical will or administrative capacity to impose significant controls on 
its labor markets. The UK was relatively late in adopting sanctions on 
employers who hire undocumented foreigners; a 1996 law instituted 
criminal penalties, but those penalties were rarely imposed until after 
2008, when a system of civil penalties was adopted (Ryan 2014, 240-
1). Still, employers were not required to check an employee‟s immi-
gration status before hiring, and the UK opted out of the European 
Union‟s 2009 directive on employer sanctions (Ryan 2014, 240-1). 
After doubling the maximum fines on employers and increasing other 
control measures in 2014, the Conservative government is currently 
pushing through still more measures against illegal work in the Immi-
gration Bill 2015-16. The bill makes illegal work a criminal offense 
and enables authorities to seize the wages of those caught engaging it, 
while employers face greater penalties and the threat of their business-
es being closed. The bill also will create a new Director of Labour 
Market Enforcement to coordinate government action against labor 
exploitation, including that involving illegal migrant work. These pro-
posed measures have been accompanied by tough rhetoric by the Tory 
government, with Immigration minister James Brokenshire declaring 
that the “full force of government machinery” will be deployed 
against “rogue employers” (Mason 2015). 
                                                   
5
  CODAF. 
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In sum, when it comes to labor market controls, cross-national varia-
tions follow a north-south axis, with France and the UK lying in the 
middle (and the UK devoting much less attention to this than France, 
until recently). While these differences have proven enduring, there 
also has been a common trend toward greater efforts to police and 
deter such work that is most evident since the mid-2000s, but that in 
some instances had begun already by the 1990s. The shift is evident in 
the Netherlands, which was relatively lax toward undocumented mi-
gration through the 1980s. Although employer sanctions have been on 
the books since 1979, they were not much enforced through the 1980s 
(Martin 2003, 60), and undocumented immigrants often could obtain a 
social-fiscal number that enabled them to work, and even pay taxes on 
that work. Since the early 1990s, only those lawfully resident are able 
to get these cards, and the 1994 Compulsory Identification Act man-
dates that employers keep records of the identification documents of 
their employees (Doomernik 2008, 137). These measures, added to the 
1998 Linkage Act that excluded irregular migrants from accessing 
social benefits, have significantly constrained the earning abilities of 
these migrants (Van der Leun 2006; Doomernik 2008, 137-8). Sanc-
tions on employers who violate the law also have been beefed up since 
2005, when an administrative fine (€8000/worker) replaced a rarely 
employed criminal sanction (De Lange 2011, 187-8). The result was a 
dramatic increase in the application of these sanctions: between 2200 
and 3000 fines were imposed each year between 2006 and 2009 (De 
Lange 2011, 188-9).
6
 
In France, detecting and penalizing undocumented immigrant work 
has been a growing policy priority – one that dates from the end of 
large-scale labor migration but that clearly has gained steam since the 
1990s. Employer sanctions were first legislated in 1972, and through-
out the 1970s and 1980s, various steps were taken to increase the ca-
                                                   
6
 As de Lange discusses, however, many of these fines concerned people from new 
EU member-states who were not yet entitled to work. With the opening of the la-
bor market to people from these countries, the number of fines imposed has likely 
declined.  
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pacity of the labor inspectorate to uncover and penalize employers 
who hire undocumented workers (Marie 1994; Miller 1995). By the 
1980s, this agenda started coming under a larger effort against travail 
dissimulé (hidden work) of all kinds (Marie 1994). More significant 
legislative shifts occurred in the 1990s, starting with a 1991 law 
against clandestine work and illegal immigration
7
 that brought togeth-
er dispersed efforts and instituted a requirement that employers file a 
formal hiring declaration before bringing someone on (Marie 1994, 
125). This was followed in 1993 by a redirection of the border police 
so that they focus also on clandestine employment and effecting de-
portations (Inciyan 1994),
8
 and in 1996, the creation of an office at-
tached to the national police that targets illegal foreign workers.
9
 In 
March 1997, another law strengthened the fight against illegal work
10
 
and created an interministerial entity to pursue this objective.
11
 Further 
legislative action against undocumented migrant work came in the 
2003 immigration law,
12
 which increased penalties on the employment 
of illegal immigrants by instituting a five year jail sentence and 
15,000€ fine (Coste 2008). In 2005, the Commission nationale à la 
lutte contre le travail illégal13 began to meet annually, and govern-
ments now regularly develop national action plans for the fight against 
illegal work.
14
 
                                                   
7
 Loi n° 91-1383 du 31 décembre 1991 renforçant la lutte contre le travail clandes-
tin et la lutte contre l'organisation de l'entrée et du séjour irréguliers d'étrangers 
en France.  
8
 Direction centrale du contrôle de l'immigration et de la lutte contre l'emploi des 
clandestins (Diccilec) 
9
 Office central pour la répression de l’immigration irrégulière et de l’emploi 
d’étrangers sans titre (OCRIEST) 
10
 Loi no 97-210 du 11 mars 1997 relative au renforcement de la lutte contre le 
travail illegal. 
11
 Délégation Interministerielle à la Lutte Contre le Travail Illégal (DILTI). 
12
 Loi n° 2003-1119 du 26 novembre 2003 relative à la maîtrise de l'immigration, au 
séjour des étrangers en France et à la nationalité. 
13
 This commission was created in 1997 but did not meet until 2005. 
14
 http://www.economie.gouv.fr/dnlf/plan-national-luttte-contre-travail-illegal-2013-2015 
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Other states have made similar shifts toward greater sustained fights 
against the employment of undocumented migrants and undeclared 
work more generally. Austria created an agency to combat undocu-
mented foreign workers in the early 1990s, and then broadened its 
scope to all undocumented work in 2004 (Jandl 2008, 37). The staff 
devoted to the agency rapidly expanded in the 2000s, and there has 
been “enormous growth in the number of workplace inspections” and 
a concomitant increase in the number of violators caught, including 
those of foreigners working without authorization (Jandl 2008, 37-8). 
Belgium also has expanded its efforts against undocumented work 
since the 2000s, with stricter regulations and more personnel devoted 
to trying to locate and sanction illegal work (Gsir 2008, 54; van 
Meeteren 2014, 71-2). And the UK, as noted earlier, has intensified its 
efforts against illegal work since the 2000s, with the Gangmasters‟ 
Licensing Authority law of 2004 spurring a crackdown on the exploi-
tation of foreign workers in agriculture and food processing, revamped 
legal authority in 2008 to sanction employers hiring illegal workers, 
and the 2015-16 immigration bill now working its way through Par-
liament. There also have been some efforts to expand controls over 
labor markets in Southern Europe as well. In Spain, fighting the illegal 
employment of non-natives “has been a constant feature of the poli-
cies of every Spanish government since the beginning of the 1990s,” 
and penalties on employers hiring irregular migrants have increased 
since the late 1990s (Aparicio et al. 2008, 265, 291).  
In sum, even with variations in the degree of enforcement, overall 
there is a trend toward the increasing surveillance and policing of do-
mestic labor markets. Some have described this as a “privatization” of 
immigration control because employers are expected to do a good bit 
of the work that might otherwise lie in the hands of state immigration 
officials (de Lange 2011). Employers are supposed to check the eligi-
bility of their employees to work, for example, and are liable for the 
employees hired by their subcontractors. As privatization connotes a 
shrinking of state responsibilities, however, a better concept is that of 
delegated governance (Guiraudon 2002; Morgan and Campbell 2011), 
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in that states are working through agents in civil society to whom they 
have delegated some responsibilities. States are thus potentially aug-
menting what Mann refers to as their infrastructural power – “the 
capacity of the state to penetrate civil society, and to implement logis-
tically political decisions throughout the realm” (Mann 1984, 189). 
Labor inspectors cannot monitor every worksite to ensure compliance 
with labor laws, for example, so they must instead induce employers 
to voluntarily abide by these rules, and other actors, such as labor un-
ions, to report any violations. In a number of cases, they also have 
augmented the central state‟s responsibilities, putting more resources 
into labor inspectorates, redirecting border police toward internal con-
trols, and expanding the policing powers of existing inspection or se-
curity personnel. Although the continuing vitality of shadow econo-
mies across Western countries is a sign of some limits to the state‟s 
infrastructural power, policy-makers in much of Europe have refused 
to accept these limits, but instead have been mounting vigorous cam-
paigns to uncover and repress undeclared economic transactions and 
bring informal or hidden work of all kinds into the formal economy. 
This does not imply that states have complete control over “unwanted 
migration.” Of course, achieving zero undocumented immigration 
should not be the standard for assessing state capacity in this area 
(Zolberg 1999), and it seems clear that liberal political systems will 
never able to fully root our and deport irregular migrants. Even so, 
immigration specialists often emphasize that, despite the often heated 
political rhetoric on the matter, European countries are hardly being 
overrun by irregular migration: during the first decades of the new 
millennium, for instance, levels of irregular migrants in the EU as a 
whole declined each year (Morehouse and Blomfield 2011), and esti-
mates of undocumented immigration show this group to amount to 
under 1 percent of the national population in most countries, and 
reaching a high of around 1.3 percent in the UK.
15
 Although there has 
been a steep increase in attempted unauthorized entries in the past few 
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 Author‟s calculations from European Migration Network (2012). 
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years, there also has been a sharp increase in border detections, and 
European states have shown themselves vigorous and fairly effective 
in their ability to deport unauthorized migrants (Schain 2013). Those 
who make it into European countries will then face impenetrable walls 
around the formal economy, and increasing risks of working in the 
informal one. 
What is driving the growing emphasis on repressing undocumented 
migrant work? The next two sections put forward a preliminary expla-
nation of both the inter-temporal shifts and some of the cross-national 
differences. 
Explaining the Temporal Trend 
For countries that have made considerable efforts to police their own 
labor markets, the timing of reforms corresponds with increased con-
cerns about migration related to European integration and growing 
numbers of asylum claims. France, Germany, Austria, the Nether-
lands, and the UK all augmented their efforts to combat undocument-
ed migrant work during the first half of the 1990s, a time of rising 
asylum requests and inflows of other migrants, owing to the collapse 
of communism and breakup of Yugoslavia (figure 2). It was also the 
period when a number of European countries were moving toward 
finalizing and implementing the Schengen accord. The initial five 
Schengen countries – France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and 
the Netherlands – signed a convention applying the agreement on June 
19, 1990, and more countries joined over the next few years, heighten-
ing concerns about how states would maintain control on irregular 
migration as the zone enlarged further to the south and east.
16
 Thus, 
starting in the early 1990s, states began adopting measures to 
strengthen internal labor market controls but also pushed for efforts by 
the European Union to address the problem of undocumented migrant 
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 Countries joined in the following order: Italy (November 27, 1990); Spain and 
Portugal (June 25, 1991), Greece (November 6, 1992), Austria (April 28, 1995), 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden (December 19, 1996). 
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work. It was also a period of other forms of increased border controls, 
with shifts of responsibility to the European Union, to transport carri-
ers, and to local governments (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000). 
Some initial reforms thus came in 1991 (France, the Netherlands) and 
then again in 1994 (France, the Netherlands) and 1996-7 (the United 
Kingdom; France). In one direct example of the redirection of re-
sources, France in 1994 created a new force dedicated to uncovering 
clandestine employment and effecting deportations, but they did this 
by taking 6000 border control agents and shifting them toward these 
new objectives (Inciyan 1994).
17
 In other words, as the traditional 
borders came down, new borders came up around labor markets, and 
enforcement agents were redeployed accordingly. Germany made a 
similar redeployment, moving 1000 former East-West customs offi-
cials to labor law enforcement (Martin and Miller 2000). It also insti-
tuted new short-term work contracts to try to bring out of the shadow 
economy the many Polish and other East European workers coming 
across the border for temporary work, often in the agricultural sector 
(Martin and Miller 2000). 
By the mid-1990s, governments also began working through EU bod-
ies to address the problem of undocumented migrant labor and other 
forms of “social dumping” in the EU.18 The Commission had tried to 
promote common action against undocumented work in the mid-
1970s,
19
 but was stymied by member-state (and especially British) 
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 The agency, Diccilec, represented a redeployment of 6000 members of the police 
de l’air et des frontières (PAF), and was replaced in 1999 by the Direction cen-
trale de la police aux frontières (DCPAF). 
18
 Germany‟s urging led to an EU directive that targeted firms moving an EU worker 
from their home country to another, yet failing to pay the prevailing local wages 
of the new country (Miller and Martin 2000, 25). Directive 96/71/EC of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the 
posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services. 
19
 Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the Harmonization of Laws in 
the Member States to Combat Illegal Migration and Illegal Employment, COM 
(76) 331 final; Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the 
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opposition to encroachment on sensitive domestic terrain (Ryan 2014, 
240). By the 1990s, however, states increasingly recognized the utility 
of EU-level coordination on immigration and asylum policy (Lavenex 
2006), and actors within the European Union started beating the drum 
about the problem of undocumented migrant labor and, more general-
ly, all forms of undeclared work. This led to a series of recommenda-
tions, communications and reports on the matter,
20
 and was echoed by 
the activities of other organizations, such as the OECD and ILO, on 
the same topics, spurred in large measure by the European Union‟s 
decision to make combating undocumented immigrant work a priori-
ty.
21
 
A second wave of reforms came in the early-to-mid-2000s, as 10 new 
member-states joined the Union (May 2004) and nine became part of 
the Schengen zone (December 2007). Many of these new member-
states had large shadow economies and potentially porous borders 
toward the East and South, and this heightened the perceived need to 
increase domestic control measures while also intensifying efforts at 
the EU level to fight undocumented work. There also was a renewed 
wave of asylum-seekers in the 2000s, although lower than the massive 
increase in the early 1990s (figure 1). During roughly the same time 
period, France (2003), Belgium (2001, 2003), Austria (2004), Germa-
ny (2004), the Netherlands (2005), and later the UK (2008) all adopt-
                                                                                                                       
Approximation of the Legislation of the Member States in Order to Combat Ille-
gal Migration and Illegal Employment, COM (78) 86 final. 
20
 Council Recommendation on Harmonizing Means of Combating Illegal Immigra-
tion and Illegal Employment and Improving the Relevant Means of Control 
96/C5/01 (December 22, 1995); Council Recommendation on Combating the Il-
legal Employment of Third-Country Nationals 96/C 304/01 (September 27 
1996); Communication from the Commission on Undeclared Work, COM(1998) 
219 (April 7, 1998); Communication from the Commission to the Council and 
the European Parliament on a common policy on illegal immigration COM 
(2001) 672 final 
21
 OECD, Combating the Illegal Employment of Foreign Workers (Paris: OECD 
2000); Labour Inspection in Europe: Undeclared Work, Migration, Trafficking 
(ILO 2010). 
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ed measures to strengthen their system of employers sanctions and 
other labor market control mechanisms. 
There also has been a continued focus on irregular migrant labor at the 
EU level, with the December 2006 European Council meeting includ-
ing both a welcome to Bulgaria and Romania as new members of the 
EU but also a call for intensified cooperation in combating irregular 
migration, including through ramped up external controls and in-
creased efforts against illegal employment.
22
 The culmination of these 
EU-level efforts was the 2009 directive for minimum standards on 
sanctions and other penalties against employers who hire undocu-
mented third-country nationals.
23
 The directive requires states to bar 
the employment of third-country nationals (TCNs) lacking authoriza-
tion, and to adopt measures that require employers to notify authori-
ties when they hire TCNs and verify that they are lawfully able to 
work. The directive also made employers liable for the hiring practic-
es of subcontractors, required that sanctions be levied against those 
violating the prohibition on hiring unauthorized TCNs, and laid out 
conditions for criminal sanctions. Countries also are supposed to make 
sure that the rights of the illegally-employed workers are protected 
and that they receive back pay they are owed, and that states arrange 
regular inspections of firms and workplaces so as to uncover these 
abuses. 
The increasing activism of the EU against undocumented migrant 
work raises the question of whether it has exerted an independent in-
fluence on domestic policy change. If there has been an effect any-
where, it has been in Southern Europe, where a number of countries 
adopted employer sanctions, or increased the penalties for them, fol-
lowing the EU‟s 2009 employer sanctions directive.  Nonetheless, in 
its 2014 communication to the European Parliament and Council 
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 Council of the European Union, Brussels European Council 16879/1/06 REV 1 
(February 12 2007).  
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 Council Directive 2009/52 Providing for Minimum Standards on Sanctions and 
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about implementation of the directive, the Commission noted that it 
initially had to launch infringement proceedings against 20 countries 
for failing to transpose the directive into legislation on time, and that 
although those proceedings have been closed, many states are not 
providing regular inspection reports to the Commission that would 
show whether they have improved enforcement of employer sanctions 
(Commission 2014). Of those states submitting reports, the Commis-
sion noted widely varying levels of effort at enforcing sanctions on the 
hiring of irregular migrant labor (Commission 2014, 9). Thus, the di-
rect effect of the EU on domestic policies in this area appears rather 
limited.  
To sum up so far, in looking at the timing of reforms and overall trend 
toward greater policing of labor markets, there is a correspondence 
between challenges to external borders – deepening and widening of 
European integration, as well as spikes in asylum applications – and 
efforts to build up internal controls. However, even though the general 
movement has been in this direction, the degree of effort still differs 
among countries. What explains these differences?  
Explaining Cross-National Differences 
Few have sought to answer this question, but those who have for the 
Southern European cases often point to the magnitude of the under-
ground economy and argue that this complicates efforts to locate ir-
regular migrant workers and penalize them and/or their employers 
(Baldwin-Edwards 1999; Finotelli and Sciortino 2009; Triandafylli-
dou and Ambrosini 2011). Undocumented workers are typically found 
in worksites that are difficult to regulate – small enterprises, family-
run businesses, farms, households, or at the endpoint of a subcontract-
ing chain – and all are found in abundance in Southern Europe. More-
over, the highly segmented and regulated labor markets in this region 
encourage off the books hiring (and firing) and fuel the demand for 
immigrant workers that will accept ill-paid, insecure forms of em-
ployment (Mingione 2001; Reyneri 2002). Some argue that these dif-
ferences stem from the particular economic development path taken 
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by Southern European countries (albeit with differences among them), 
marked by late industrialization, continued significance of the agricul-
tural sector, traditional gender roles and family arrangements, and 
deep segmentation of the labor market. Where economic demand for 
large-scale migration declined in many Northern European countries 
by the 1970s, Spain, Italy and Greece all began attracting labor mi-
grants by the 1980s and 1990s, reflecting the demand for labor in sec-
tors eschewed by native workers (Baldwin-Edwards 1999). 
While insightful about some basic structural features of Southern Eu-
ropean economies, some of these accounts verge on the circular – with 
the lack of regulation of illegal work resulting from the lack of regula-
tion that has produced large amounts of illegal work – and tend to 
leave political mechanisms underspecified. They also tend to obscure 
some commonalities between regions: Northern European economies 
generally do have smaller shadow economies than those in the South, 
yet the differences are perhaps not as marked as some might like to 
believe (figure 1). In the early 2000s when many governments began 
prioritizing the fight against undeclared work of all kinds, the shadow 
economy in countries such as Germany, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, 
and Belgium ranged from 17% to over 21% of the formal economy – 
not terribly far from Spain (22.2%) or Italy (26.1%). Recognition and 
measurement of the phenomenon is what led many of these countries 
to step up their efforts to combat undeclared work and the under-
ground economy more generally, begging the question of why some 
states have prioritized the issue more than others. 
One way forward is to examine differences in the landscape of eco-
nomic interests that are due, in part but not solely, to the structural 
features described above. An informal economy that relies heavily on 
migrant labor generates employer interests in the status quo. Rarely 
are these views voiced as bluntly as they were in Italy following a 
crackdown on illegal work that led a group of employers to form a 
“Pro Illegal Labor Committee” in protest (Zincone 2006, 363). In gen-
eral, the large sector of small employers favors a more open immigra-
LIEPP Working Paper n° 54 
23 
tion policy in order to attract the necessary workforce, and is happy to 
turn to undocumented migrants to supply that labor (Watts 2002). Sec-
toral or local associations thus tend to advocate for more open poli-
cies, cutting against the views of national employer associations that 
tend to represent larger firms, but precisely because of these differ-
ences in opinion – and the political unpopularity of openly advocating 
more immigration – the national associations tend to keep quiet (Watts 
2002). That makes it rather difficult to tell whether governments in 
this region are actually doing the bidding of employers associations, 
or simply anticipating the likely political and economic fall-out should 
they seek to more aggressively target the undocumented migrant work 
on which important segments of the economy rely.  
We might expect the stance of employers to be different in Scandina-
via, Germany, France, Austria, or the Netherlands, given the prepon-
derance of firms relying on high productivity workers and the institu-
tionalized influence of employers‟ associations in corporatist decision-
making institutions. Employers‟ associations should therefore be less 
protective of firms taking the low road of hiring cheap, undocumented 
labor, and better functioning systems of economic management should 
help deliver workers to those sectors that need them, again obviating 
the need for a turn to illegal work. In Germany, we can find some 
support for this argument in the fact of employer support for the 2004 
law against undeclared work and tax fraud that increased penalties on 
employers violating the law and enhanced the power of customs offi-
cials to enter and inspect worksites and vehicles (Vogler-Ludwig 
2007, 6).
24
 To address the continued demand for illegal work in cer-
tain sectors, alliances were forged between the German Federal gov-
ernment and social partners in the lower-skill/lower-wage construction 
and transport industries, committing business associations to push 
their own members to uphold the law (Vogler-Ludwig 2007, 6-7). 
Other government policies have sought to deliver legal workers to 
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 Gesetz zur Intensivierung der Bekämpfung der Schwarzarbeit und damit zusam-
menhängende Steuerhinterziehung of July 23, 2004. 
2016/05 
24 
these sectors and taken other measures to bring above ground this 
work in the shadow economy. Thus, a series of bilateral treaties with 
Eastern European countries in the 1990s brought in workers to the 
construction, agriculture, and tourism industries (Menz 2009, 180), 
while the creation of mini-jobs and other deregulatory labor market 
policies helped reduce the size of the black market economy.  
Further research is needed to see whether there is a similar pattern of 
employer support (or at least passive acceptance) in other countries. 
But the general support – or non-opposition – of employers groups 
may help explain why political parties on the right in these countries 
have pursued stricter policies on irregular migrant work. In the Neth-
erlands, for example, the shift toward more restrictive internal controls 
on immigration began in the 1990s, under mixed left-right govern-
ments, and there appears to be a wide consensus around vigorous 
German labor market control, including employer sanctions (Vogel 
2000). In France, several of the most visible efforts to combat undoc-
umented migrant work have come under conservative governments 
(1994; 1996-7; 2003; 2005). Although a 1997 French law against 
clandestine work was watered down following construction industry 
lobbying in the Senate (Monnot 1997), in the 2000s employers kept 
mum in the face of requirements that they help pay to expel illegally-
hired immigrant workers (Portes 2005), and employers‟ associations 
and unions in the construction industry signed charters of good con-
duct against illegal work (Rey-Lefebvre 2005). 
Another potential North-South difference lies in the standpoint of or-
ganized labor. Trade unions in Spain and Italy have generally been 
ambivalent, if not outright hostile, to campaigns to uncover undocu-
mented workers. In part, this reflects their view of the perennial nature 
of the shadow economy and thus futility of efforts to target it (Watts 
2002). But their perspectives may also reflect their structural position: 
unions in Southern Europe generally lack institutionalized power and 
thus have been unable to shape immigration policy in a way that 
would protect their own members. Moreover, in a number of these 
LIEPP Working Paper n° 54 
25 
countries, unions have experienced organization decline. Immigrant 
workers represent a source of revitalization, leading labor unions in 
both countries to oppose aggressive attempts to police the informal 
economy (Watts 2002). In Italy, for instance, where union bargaining 
power often lies at the sectoral or company level, they have sought to 
bring precarious workers into unions in order to help bolster their 
numbers (Pulignano, Gervasi and de Franceschi 2016). In Spain, un-
documented workers are seen as potential future members, and in both 
countries unions have supported the regularizations that facilitate the 
empowerment, and unionization, of these workers (Watts 2002). 
In several of the Northern economies, by contrast, unions often have a 
more institutionalized position – and thus fewer incentives to reach 
out to immigrant workers – and instead have pursued enforcement of 
sanctions on employers for violating labor laws. Krings (2009) finds 
that unions overall have been less supportive of undocumented immi-
grants in Germany and Austria, for example, and the same has been 
said of the Netherlands, where unions have put little energy into or-
ganizing migrant workers (Connolly, Marino and Lucio 2014). In 
general, unions in these countries have supported strict laws against 
illegal work and opposed regularization of the undocumented popula-
tion; in Germany, for instance, labor unions supported the 2004 law 
increasing penalties on illegal work (Vogler-Ludwig 2007). In addi-
tion, strong trade unions embedded in corporatist institutions make it 
difficult for employers to violate rules with regard to illegal employ-
ment, as unions are liable to report them to authorities (Hammar 1999, 
188; Brochmann 1999, 217). For years, Swedish unions have tipped 
off police about worksites with undocumented workers, although they 
have faced some pushback from within the union movement and by 
others on the left about this practice (Selberg 2014, 261-4).  Similarly, 
German and Austrian unions in the construction sector collaborated 
with authorities in trying to uncover employers guilty of hiring of un-
documented workers (Krings 2009, 133-6). 
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The stance of French unions on irregular migration and illegal work is, 
in many ways, more like that of unions in Southern Europe, and again 
reflects labor‟s structural position in the French economy. Lacking 
institutionalized power and facing organizational fragmentation and 
decline, unions are hardly in a position to shape immigration policy. 
They have instead become more supportive of immigrant workers and 
skeptical of government policies against illegal work (Haus 2002). In 
this, they not only seek to position themselves vis-à-vis immigrants as 
potential members, but also to put themselves on the side of the labor 
inspectorate (who are unionized themselves). Labor inspectors have 
repeatedly voiced discontent at being drawn into immigration control 
policy, protesting that undocumented immigrants make up a small 
share of illegal work, and that their first obligation is to protect work-
ers‟ rights, not to facilitate deportations (Bernard and Herzberg 1996; 
Zappi 2003; Aizicovici 2007). Several unions have therefore stood 
behind the labor inspectorate when it protested becoming too tied up 
with the immigration enforcement agenda of the government. 
The UK lies in a somewhat different position, perhaps reflecting dis-
tinctive aspects of its pluralist industrial relations model and its eco-
nomic profile. With no guaranteed place in the political system, busi-
ness and labor organizations lobby to be heard and are not infrequent-
ly ignored. For instance, both unions and employers have long op-
posed the imposition of sanctions on employers hiring illegal workers. 
Much as in Southern Europe, unions approach the labor migration 
issue from a position of weakness; lacking a guaranteed place at the 
bargaining table, facing organizational decline and neglect from the 
Labour party, unions have taken on the concerns of minority and im-
migrant workers. Business groups also have not favored government 
laws targeted illegal work, resisting the imposition of more red tape on 
the hiring process. Labor unions and business associations thus en-
tered into an alliance against employer sanctions measures included in 
the 1996 immigration reform, arguing that they would turn employers 
into immigration control officers and increase discrimination against 
minority workers (Haus 2002, 173-4). Although somewhat watered 
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down, the 1996 measure passed anyway, and since 2008 both Labour 
and Conservative governments have worked to further toughen em-
ployer sanctions and other forms of labor market controls, regardless 
of the critical views of these measures by labor unions and business 
groups.  
Features of the British economy may help explain this disregard: in 
contrast to the Southern European economies, the deregulated labor 
market in Britain offers considerable flexibility to firms when it comes 
to hiring and firing. There is less of a need for a low-wage illegal mi-
grant safety valve – cheap, manipulable labor is assured through regu-
lar forms of employment (King and Rueda 2008) – and thus clamping 
down on undocumented migrant work is less likely to have the kind of 
reverberations on firm survival that it might have in the Southern Eu-
ropean context. 
Conclusion 
Until the recent re-imposition of formal border controls by six EU 
member-states (and Norway) in the last year, the Schengen act had 
effectively removed formal borders between most European countries. 
But as official barriers came down, many states responded by impos-
ing internal forms of immigration control. Building walls around wel-
fare states and labor markets was one such response, the goal being to 
deny the means of sustenance to immigrants lacking authorization that 
could no longer be reliably stopped at the borders. Both the implemen-
tation of Schengen and subsequent enlargement of the border-free 
zone to the East, coupled with recurrent movements of people seeking 
asylum in Europe, have spurred the overall domestic and EU-level 
focus on undocumented migrant work. The resulting policies and 
campaigns represent an attempt to redeploy state power and resources, 
rather than a shrinking and hollowing out of the state, as some have 
proposed.  
Nonetheless, there are variations in the degree of effort devoted to 
rooting out and repressing undocumented migrant labor and illegal 
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work more generally. The explanation for these variations is still pre-
liminary, but it seems likely that the landscape of organized economic 
interests, reflecting in turn basic features of the political economies of 
these states, can help explain variations. Unions approach the issue of 
irregular migrant labor from quite different standpoints, as do employ-
ers. While those in more corporatist political economies of Northern 
Europe generally agree on the need for strict and enforceable controls, 
those in Southern Europe tend to favor a laxer policy. France is a bit 
of a mixed case – with employers looking more like those in Northern 
Europe, and unions more like those to the South – while in the UK, 
governments of all stripes seem increasingly inclined to ignore the 
preferences of both unions and employers‟ groups as they pursue 
stricter crackdowns on illegal work. The conservative government is 
currently enacting new measures targeting illegal migrant workers and 
those who employ them, regardless of employer protestations. This 
may be because the economic need for illegal migrant labor in a de-
regulated labor market is less pressing than in other parts of Europe, 
where labor protections create inflexibilities that employers chafe un-
der. 
Although immigration scholars have long made the distinction be-
tween external and internal forms of immigration control (Brochmann 
and Hammar 1999), thus far there has been relatively little research on 
how states attempt to limit irregular migrant work. That is somewhat 
surprising, given how often scholars and policy-makers assert that 
employer sanctions are vital for limiting the size of the undocumented 
migrant population. Even fewer scholars have investigated the politi-
cal dynamics around this mode of immigration control. Among the 
many future directions for research could be greater analysis of how 
different policies intersect to shape the overall demand for and use of 
illegal migrant work. This paper has only passingly referred to one of 
the other ways policy-makers have targeted the shadow economy (and 
therefore irregular migration): deregulating labor markets (mini-jobs, 
temporary contracts, etc.) and subsidizing low-wage employment in 
order to bring this work from out of the shadows. These strategies 
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have been widespread in Northern Europe, and include efforts to en-
courage and subsidize domestic labor (Morel and Carbonnier 2015). 
Future research could profitably situate policies against irregular mi-
grant work within a larger policy strategy vis-à-vis the lower end of 
the labor market. Doing so would shed light on a concrete mechanism 
of immigration governance, the political economy of low-wage work, 
and the implications of both for the well being of migrant workers and 
our theorizing about European states. 
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